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ABSTRACT ... 
\ 
After almost eighteen years of Direct Rule (1972 t~.,, 
1989) in Northern Ireland by the British government, the 
problem of a solution to the Ulster crisis remains elusive. 
This paper examines alternatives to the status quo within 
the framework of an investigation into past British efforts 
to reach an end to both terrorism and the absence of 
~ 
stability in Northern Ireland. It is contended that the 
/ 
/' . problem of terrorism cannot be resolved without a political 
settlement. 
After discussing the events that resulted • in 
Britain's intervention in Northern Ireland, this paper takes 
a look at the main issues which separate the two ethnic 
groups in Ulster - Protestants and Catholics. The two groups 
are characterized by a· distinct history, political view, and 
(obviously) religion. Each has its own affect on the 
politics of today. 
This is followed by an examination of British policies 
since 1972. Faced with increasiri~ sectarian violence and the 
int·ransigence of Northern politicians, British policies have 
taken a two-pronged track: poli.tical initiatives t.owcrrd 
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\ 
reconciliation and policies to combat terrorism. This 
paper's examination of these policies shows that they have 
·failed.The locus of this failure resides in Britain's lack 
of a long-term strategy toward a political solution. 
Instead, most of its energies have been directed toward 
combatting terrorism. Even so, Britain's approach has been 
uneven such that it ebbs and flows in response to dramatic 
terrorist events that result in the loss of life. 
Four potential options are explored as alternatives to 
the status quo in Ulster. These are devolution, integration, 
·, 
\ 
4 
unification, and independence. These alternatives are 
analysed in light of the intended and unintended 
consequences each may have for those that have a stake in (1 
'11 
Northern Ireland which, 'besides Britain, Ulster Protestants, 
and Catholics, includes the Republic of Ireland as well. Of 
the four options, it is concluded that the creation of an 
independent Ulster offers the best foundation on which to 
build peace. 
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INTRODUCTION 
..Y, Twenty years ago this August the British-" government 
I' 
sent its trgops to Northern Ireland hoping that the British 
army would bring stability to a deeply chaot·ic situation. 
Three yea·rs later, in. 1972, terrorist violence was at its 
• 
• • height, and the prospects looked bleaker. The refusal by the 
devolved Northern Ireland Gove~~ment to willingly cede its 
, .... 
, 
... 
power of law and··, order to the British Government forced 
British Prime Minister Edward Heath to abolish Northern 
Ireland's government. The period of Direct Rule began and it 
continues to this very day. 
' 
Indeed, in the present day, the continued campaigns of 
Irish terrorists, the enormous number of fatalities and 
dislocation 
• • • 1nJur1es, social • economic and and the of 
' . thousands, make the need for a solution to the Ulster crisis· 
urgent. Thus, to at:.tack the problem of governing Ulster is 
" 
• to analyze a very current issue of today's political scene. 
This problem is a fascin~ting,_ intriguing one for the 
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student of politics for it bespeaks basic questions which 
are fundamental to an understanding of government and the 
need for consensus. The questions that this paper answers 
include: what should the status of Northern Ireland be vis-
a-vis Great Brit~~in? . '( vis-a-vis the Republic of Ireland? 
Should government in the six counties be one of majority 
rule? or of shared powers among the parties~ 
These questions have plagued the British government and 
four prime ministers· for almost two decades. Most of the 
writers on the subject are pessimists who despair at finding 
answers. "The problem with Northern Ireland is there is no 
solution," it is sai·a. 9r, "Once ·you've solved the Irish 
question, the Irish change the question!" These are common 
holdings among academics, journalj_sts, and politicians close 
to the Ulster scene. Yet, it is the continued violence that 
• 
should prompt an unceasing search for 'a solution to the 
political instability that~characterizes the province. 
This paper examines political alternatives as possible 
solutions to a political settlement for Northern Ireland. It 
does so after an examination of the events that immediately 
preceded_Direct Rule, of the sectarian differences that shape 
~ 
,. the two ethrf:ip groups of Ulster (Catholic and Protestant), 
'f 
and of th~ past British policies aimed at achieving both a 
political settlement and the.defeat of terrorism. It is hoped 
that the reader will ~e persuad~d that the best chance of 
"'? 
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. bringing normality to that corner of the island is an Ulster 
... 
that is separate from both Great Britain and the Republic of 
Ireland. 
,, . 
1, 
Perhaps the most significant finding of this paper is 
that the failure of British policy in Northern Ireland rests 
I 
primarily in the view that the most important problem in the 
• 
province is one of security, i.e. the need to combat 
~' 
, 
terrorism. This ll\Yopia is a barrier to the real root of the 
. 
problem: the need for a political solution which will settle 
the issue of the status of Ulster in the United Kingdom: 
Britain is hampered in its efforts by a cultural bias 
toward Uls.termen who are view as inferior to Britons. This 
is compounded by a visceral dislike of the IRA who antagonize , 
L 
the British to such an extent that London, as will be shown, 
tends to view· Pr<>testant extremists ( such as the UDA) as 
somewhat legitimate. 
This paper takes the perspective that it is Britain that 
must take the initiative in solving the Ulster problem for 
two reasons. First, as the sovereign, Britain alone bears 
ultimate responsibility for the affairs of Ulster. 
Historically, however, the U. K. () has tried its b .. est to 
,,, 
overlook, this responsibility. Secondly, the absence of 
British initiatives at finding a political solution • in 
'Northern Ireland· simply underwri,tes the /Stagnation th,at 
'---··) 
' ' 
characterizes the present political state of affairs. In 
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this,·Britain appears: weak and weary from its difficulties. 
This only encourages the extremist violence that all hope to 
avoid. 
.. Good pol icy, however, is not grounded· on hope .. -- and 
inactivity. Rather, it i's based on an_ understanding of 
interest and desired goals. If Britain's interest is • 1n 
bringing stability to the province, a fresh. look at an old 
problem would be beneficial. 
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( Chapter I: The Fall of the Old Regime 
,• 
' 
Northern Ireland began its existence in- 1920 when, after 
years of struggle, --the twenty-six counties of Ireland that 
make up the Republic of Ireland were granted independence 
through the Government of Ireland Act. 1 Six of the nine 
counties that formed the province of Ulster were exempted 
from the plan of independence and were constituted as 
Northern Ireland with a devolved government that would rule 
in the new statelet as to matters of local jurisdiction. 
Initially, the plan envisioned two parliaments in Ireland -
one in Dublin and one in Belfast which would elect 
representatives to an all-Ireland parliament that would 
govern in are~s of common concern. Both new governments were , 
given the option under the 1920 Act of declaring against 
membership in the all-Ireland parliament, which is what the 
Northern parliament did. With that, a treaty was established 
,til • ~ • between the South, which had become the Irish Free State, and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
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This tr.eaty, the Anglo-Irish Treaty, recognized a border that 
divided Ireland in two,parts; each has proceeded on its own 
distinct path. 
Northern Ireland's government was styled after that.at 
Westminster and Whitehall. Elections were based on majority 
rule, and a Government was formed by the majority party . 
,. 
There was a cabinet of various ministers which was led by a 
prime minister. The monarch was represented by a royal 
governor. Since the creation of Northern Ireland was 
specifically designed to enable the Protestants, who are 
unionists, to have a dominant majority in the new province, 
Protestants formed the Government of Northern Ireland for 
fifty years without exception. 
Uninterrupted unionist rule brought on abuses that 
impacted upon the Catholic minority. The latter felt the ill 
effects of being a politically unprotected minority as there 
was discrimination with regard to housing and employment; a 
restriction on the local s.uffrage; and gerrymandering. These 
() 
conditions engendered hostilities between the two ethnic 
.,, 
groups 
decades. 
that continued, almost I I simmering, for over four 
The contemporary period that is now eup11,emistically 
' 
·' ~ 
with a civil rights ~ovement krtswn as "the Troubles" began 
'\ 
~hat sought to correct the societal imbalances in.Northern 
• 
Ireland. ·In 1968, members of the catholic minority formed a 
.. 
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civil rights group called the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
. 
Association (NICRA). The·Associati~n advocated change within 
the existing political system, -a novel approach at the time 
since Catholics historically denied the legitima~y of the 
I 
' regime. NICRA called for an end to discrimination of 
Catholics in employment and housing, elimination of the 
Ulster Special Constabulary (called the "B Specials" - a 
Protestant civilian policing auxiliary whose only function 
was to beat up -Catholics), the abolishment of the Special 
Powers Act2, the redistribution of electoral boundaries, and 
the ending of restrictions on the suffrage. 3 
Although predominantly Catholic, Enloe points out that 
Its founders intended it to be non communal, to join 
enlightened Catholics and Protestants in demanding that the Unionist party end its anti-democratic 
mode of government .... While it was true that the Catholics were the most legally deprived sector.of the population, the civil rights spokesmen were • 'it. • • J arguing for the modernization of Ulster's whole political system .... 4 
Demonstrations by the members of NICRA occurred in 1968 
and 1969. The Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O'Neill 
. 
was sympathetic to the pleas of NICRA and he martialed a 
fragile majority of his Unionist Party to institute 
substantive reforms. 5 But the marches were attended . with 
violence. Demonstrations in January_ and August, 1969; were 
met by Protestant extremists. Riots between the civil rights "-v 
activists and police erupted, anq during the latter occasion, 
when the Royal Ulster Constabulary was unable to control the 
9 
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• 
situation, the "B Specials'' were mobilized and the result was 
the burning to the ground of 100 Catholic homes 
Londonderry's Bogside district. 6 
• in 
· During this-period, 1968 and 1969, the increasing level 
of violence was receiving international · media publicity.· 
International pressure was mounting on the United Kingdom 
government to take action. However, since 1920 Britain had 
separqted itself from the politics of Northern Ireland. A 
noted s-cholar of Northern Irish politics, Richard Rose, 
stated: 
The creation of a Northern Ireland Parliament was welcomed as a means of getting Irish business out of the House of Commons. In 1923, the Spea~er of the House of Commons established a convention that matters should not be raised there that were within the responsibility of the· Stormont government. This convention,, was strictly adhered to for more than four decades. 7 
The British civil service was unable to help because 
.... the Home Office staff dealing with Northern Ireland ... had been assimilated into the General Department, which covered such miscellaneous matters as London taxicabs, British Summer Time and state-owned pubs in Carlisle. 8 
As a result of this political separation, the British were 
thus unp~epared to deal with events that _would occur as a 
-result of the civil ·rights movement. 
I 
The violence in Londonderry, and coincident riots in ' 
II 
Belfast, in August 1969 convinced Harold Wilson, the prime 
" 
minister of Britain, that British troops were required in ¥I 
Ulster to keep the peace. 9 Forces of tire British Arn1y arrived 
\ 
- \_ 
\ 
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in Northern Ireland on August 14, 1969. O'Brien makes it 
clear that the arrival of the army prevented a horrible human 
; 
tragedy. He _states: ''· .. (T)here is no doubt that, had the 
British Government not intervened with its own forces, the 
Catholics of Belfast were in danger of decimation •.. 10 
The arrival of British troops in Londonderry was a 
signal event in the history of Northern Ireland. First, 
deployment of the army represented a break with the past 
British practice of leaving Northern Ireland to itself. 
Although the Downing Street Declaration, a communique which 
set out Anglo-Ulster relation;S soon after military 
. ( 
intervention, declared that "resp6Q.¥bility for affairs in 
Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic [i.e. 
Ulster] jurisdiction, 1111 the presence of the army ~eant that 
Westminster would be closely involved with policy matters, 
'particularly those involving security and the powers of the 
police. 
Secondly, the arrival of the British Army ultimately 
(: 
presented a new raison d'etre for the Irish Republican Army. 
From 1962 to 1969, the IRA was inactive following a failed 
campaign that began in 1956 but was met with public 
indifference and governmental re_sistance by both Stormont and 
the Republic. 12 Thus, when the ri~ts of 1969 occurred, the 
" 
IRA was caught unprepared and could offer the Catholic 
population no defence from the Protestant extremism that 
.• 
) 
• 
1···-,, 
.,· 
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.. 
greeted NICR.A and their demonstrations. 13. Initially, the 
British Army's arrival was welc0med by the Catholic 
population who were, as was noted above, in severe peril. 14 
l 
However, a political blunder occurred when operational 
• given over to the civilian the troops >was command of 
authorities at Stormont. Soon this policy would prove 
detrimental to stability for as two observers noted: 
By leaving Stormont as the final authority in the 
province with its built-in Unionist majority, and 
by using the troops as the enforcers of the final 1 
authority, [the U.K. Government] ensured 
that ... people would associate the two things with 
each other. 15 
· 
Catholics~ in their uncertainty about the disposition of the 
troops, turned to the IRA for help. 
The Irish Republican Army 
The Irish Republican Army is a group that follows in the 
long Irish tradition of political separatist violence. This 
tradition is an historic struggle for emancipation from 
British colonialism. Its origins began with Wolfe Tone and 
his Society of United Irishmen in the late eighteenth 
ce·ntury, continued through 1848 and the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (whose members w~re called Fenians), reemerged 
in the acme Rule period as the Irish Volunteers, and then in 
.1916. when the Easter Rebellion occurred, the IRA was founged 
to lead the struggle for independence which resulted in th~ 
·"'' ', '·''•'"' ,.,.,, .. -s" 
.... 
' 
12 
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' 
birth of the Irish Free state. Thus political violence is 
very much.woven into the fabric of Iri~h nationalism, and 
thus lends cultural legitimacy to the IRA in its terrorist 
struggle against the British in Ulster. 16 
In 1968-69, however, the IRA was very much divided on t, 
the issues of political efforts and whether to initiate a 
guerilla campaign. The internal debate forced a split, 
I 
in 
December 1969, between two factions. The first of these was 
a minority who were sympathetic to Catholic calls for action, 
and to the idea that the British army and the Stormont regime 
were one and the same .. They decided to form the Provisional 
IRA (PIRA) with their sole purpose being to drive the British 
out of Northern Ireland and to bring Ulster into a united 
Ireland, by whatever means necessary. 17 
The majority of the IRA was led by a more intellectual 
group which was steeped in Marxist ideology and the concept 
of a worker's revolution. It hoped to raise the political 
consciousness of the working class largely through its 
propaganda, although it also utilized force for various 
purposes. It's goal was to be the vanguard of a worker's 
revolution that would be prologue to a communist state. 
Because of the split and the formation of the Provisional 
IRA, the IRA became the Official IRA. 18 
The rebirth of separatist violence in the campaign of 
the PIRA added a new dimension to the problem of government. 
13 
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in Northern Ireland. To what started as a political.movement 
with expanding 
. \ 'y-rl., /.~ -· l 
support 1 among the minority was added a 
terrorist campaign that proved difficult for the authorities 
to control. This campaign was- met by Protestant terrorist 
groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force and, later in 1972, 
the Ulster Defence Association. These militant Protestant 
groups had their own roots in the Home Rule period when 
Protestant militias sprang up to prevent Ulster from being 
included in a new separate Ireland. 19 
Britain, meanwhile, continued to pressure the Stormont 
regime to implement reforms, most of which were along the 
.... 
' lines advocated by NICRA. As a result, the "B Specials" were 
abolished, the Royal Ulster Constabulary was disarmed, 
restrictions on the suffrage were ended, and a Central 
Housing Authority was created to eliminate the discrimination 
that had attended the distribution of new housing 
developments. 20 These efforts, one would think, should have 
helped ameliorate the societal tensions tha-t existed • 1n 
Ulster. Yet, there was the other side of the ledger, the 
problem of increasing violence. Hillyard describes the 
dilemma: 
(From 1969 to-1971] the·· strategy of the British government was 1 not to define the problem in terms 
of ·law and order but to deal with it at a number 
of different levels. On the one hand, there was a . 
J real attempt to correct the arbitrary· and inequitable administration.of criminal laws and to' 
establish institutions which would deal with the 
widespread problem of disqrimination. Liberal 
.. 
,, 
' 14 
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. ... 
notions ..• were mobilised in support of reforms but 
no attempt was made to ensure that the notions were 
realised in practice .... on the other ~and~ the increasing violence on the streets, coupled with 
the demands of the Protestant community for tougher , 
measures, led to the development of a more coercive 
strategy to deal with the problem of violence. 21 
~ The lynchpin in this "coercive strategy" was the use of 
internment, that is the power to imprison suspected 
terrorists without warrant as provided by the Special Powers 
Act. The Northern Ireland Government used two i::easons to 
support its· use of internment. First, from January 1 to 
August 9, 1971, there had been a dramatic increase in the 
number of deaths and injuries. 22 Second, it was argued that 
ordinary processes . of law wer~ unable to overcome the 
"intimidatory pressures'' 
threats. 23 
on 
I I Juries from terroristic 
.. The effect of internment on the Catholic community's 
alienalion .from the state was overwhelming. On August 9, 342 
people were arrested and placed in internment camps. Of 
th,ese, all but five were Catholic. 24 In the first five 
months, up to January 1972, 2,357 people were arrested. 25 The 
"" interrogations that accompanied some of these arrests were, ) . . . , 
according to Amnesty Internati~nal, characterized by torture 
and bruta'Ii ty. 26 Four thous~nd people fled south to the 
Republic. 27 For those that remained, there was widespread 
fear. Reverend Dennis Faul provided the following testimony 
• .. 
to the United states Congress": 
i 
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( 
For every man arrested about ten members of his family have been affected and many of· his 
neighbors. One can say that the whole Catholic population of Northern Ireland has been affected 
and terrorized by the use of the Special Powers or the imminent threat that they can be used any day 
on any particular Catholic family. 28 
With internment, c~tholic solidarity with the PIRA 
intensified. "The Catholics had been, in effect, driven into 
the hands of the IRA," one writer put it. 29 Internment 
proved to be a watershed in the history of Ulster violence. 
In 1971, 173 people were killed in sectarian violence. In 
,. 
' ·, .,J., 
... 
. 
1972, the year after internment was announced 467 deaths 
occurred. 30 The policy had two fatal consequences for the 
Stormont regime. First, not only did.violence not abate, but 
initially those prisoners suspected of being IRA members 
were, in fact, "old men or ... inactive IRA members for many 
years" 31 and thus the active membership was unaffected. 
Secondly, the alienation of the Catholic minority was such 
' . 
that the legitimacy of the Stormont re.gime was fully shaken 
in the eyes of Westminster, and all that was needed was a 
proverbial final nail in the coffin. That was provided on 
Bloody Sunday, January 13, 1972 when British paratroopers 
• 
killed thirteen unarmed civilians in Londonderry. 32 When the 
British government decided to take over full policing and 
security powers in the province, the Northern Irish cabinet 
resigned. Thereupon, Prime Minister Edward Heath abolished 
the Stormont parliament and began Direct Rule from London~ 33 
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The chapter had ended, another was beginning. 
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Chapter II: The Ethnic .. Divide: Protestants and catholics 
The events outlined in chapter one do not explain an 
o£tious question: how has politics become so polarized as to 
' provide the conditions which are the fertilizer for violence? 
An answer is found in the dichotomy that is characteristic 
of the population of Northern Ireland. This dichotomy 
• 
coRcerns ethnicity. 
... 
' 'Ethnicity," Enloe states, "refers to a peculiar bond 
• 
among persons that causes them to consider themselves a group 
distinguishable from others. The content of the bond I 1S a 
shared cul t·ure . [Ethnic identity] is a familiar and 
I 
reassuring anchor I 1n a climate of turbulence ,. and 
uncertainty. 1134 <¥· 
This chapter examines these "peculiar bonds'' that have 
polarized th.e people of Ulster I in order to achieve an 
understanding which is .essential if a solution to the Irish 
·o ·question is to have a sound basis. 
Two ethnic groups dominate the province of Ulster. 
• t. /\, 
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Within each is found a particular history, religion, and 
political view. For simplific.ation, they are usually referred 
to as Protestant and Catholic, their rel.\gious division. 
Appropriate ethnic or tribal labels are Scots-Irish and 
Irish-Irish. Politically, they are unionist and nationalist. 
To understand the political milieu in Northern Ireland one 
must know what separates the two ethnic groups. 
History 
Protestants and Catholics in Ulster each have a distinct 
history. While a full treatment is not required here, it is 
instructive to summarize the essentials of that history. The 
Irish have known Catholicism since the Middle Ages. With the 
Reformation, however, England, particularly after the 
. 
seventeenth century Scottish • succession, was anxious to 
r 
secure Ireland from the influence of the Catholic powers, 
most notably France. Toward that end, Irish lands confiscated 
by the Crown from I~ish rebels - who had no sentiment for the 
Reformation and were staunchly Catholic - were turned over 
to Scottish landlords who became known as Planters. These 
lands were located throughout historic Ulster. The Planters, 
now Scots-Irish, established a landed class which were 
resented by the Irish-Irish. 35 The Scots brought with them 
their Presbyterianism, a Protestant sect which differed from 
19 
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• 
the officially recognized Church of England, also Protestant, 
because the Scots considered 'it to be too "Rome-ish". 
In their situation as settlers in the northeastern part 
of the island of Ireland, .. the Scots:..Irish Protestants quickly 
realized their position as a resented minority, and 
consequently adopted a "siege mentality" such that they 
distrusted the native Irish. 36 
With the industrial revolution of the nineteenth 
century, the "conscious separatism" dividing Catholic and 
Protestant, the North and the South, grew. Within Ulster, the 
wealthier Protestant landlords were able to invest their 
capital in emerging industries and take greater advantage of 
ifidustrialization. Catholic and Protestant labor~rs were in 
competition for jobs, and political realities were such that 
-·) 
Protestant workers were favored for employment. Urban riots-
occurred which helped deepen the sectarian rift. 37 At the 
same time, the prosperity that was a consequence of 
industrialism was, Darby writes, "confined almost entirely 
to the northern part of the country. • . " so that "(t) he 
greater prosperity of the North, its economic structure, even 
its physical appearance, increased its alienation from the 
rest of Ireland. 1138 Alternatively, as the alienation from the 
South grew, 
enhanced. 39 
l 
economic links with Great Britain were 
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Politics 
,. 
Irish separatism in its modern form, as distinguished 
from separatism in the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth 
century when it was led by Protestant Ulster nationalists, 
developed because of the leadership of Parnell and the 
recognition of its momentum and force by the Liberal.leader 
Gladstone. 40 Gladstone and his Liberal Party, in 1885, could 
govern only in coalition with the Irish nationalist 
politicians led by Parnell. This political reality combined 
with the .. q.ctivities of the Fenian movement, Catholic radicals 
·-.; ... ,, 
who used terror to demonstrate their demands for a separate 
Ireland, led Gladstone to propose a Bill for Home Rule. 
Gladstone's proposal ultimately led, after thirty-four years 
and three versions of the Home Rule Bill, to the Government 
of Ireland Act 1920, and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 which 
separated the South, the Irish Free State, from the Union and 
created the territory of Northern Ireland. 
Northern political divisions between Catholic and 
Protestant are·rooted in the events surrounding Home Rule. 
Today's unionists are, almost totally, Protestants who are 
committed to maintaining the link with Britain forever and 
refuse to become part of a· united Ireland. Today's 
. 
nationalists, also called republicans, see Northern Ireland 
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as an artificial creation, imposed by a foreign power, that 
disrupts the historical and geographical integrity of the 
· island of Ireland . 
What followed the creation of Northern Ireland was the 
\ 
establishment of one party rule. For nearly fifty years, .the 
Ulster Unionist Party, as a consequence of the two-third 
Protestant population, held total power at Stormont. "A 
c_·. . "---...., 
Protestant state for a Protestant people," was a famous (or 
infamous) statement made at the founding · of the Northern 
Ireland government. The emphasis on sectarian division at the 
outset meant that the Catholic majority would not be welcome 
in government. Discrimination in many areas of society (such 
as housing, employment, voting, etc.) against Catholics 
occurred. With regard to employment, the net effect was the 
creation of a situation whereby today the figure of the 
chronically unemployed fell disproportionately upon Catholics 
at a rate of two and one-half times that of Protestants. 41 
Yet, the cause of the discrimination was two-fold. On the 
one-hand, the "siege mentality" obviously played a major role 
in creating the disposition of the Protestants to fear the 
Catholics. Altern·at.i-vely, the C~tholic nationalist's active 
refusal . . recognize of the government legitimacy the to 
instigated a social chasm that was, and continues to be, 
difficult to bridge. 42 Despite the ills that prevailed in 
. _,.~ ) 
t 'Ulster society, there was little effort to correct the 
I 
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problems because of the fear of causing the spark that would 
ignite social unrest. Devlin noted: 
. 
The attitude of the average Ulsterman can be summed 
up as 'You' 11 get enough to do you. ' Everyone knows 
that there are ills in our society, but if you have 
a job you content yourself with it and mind your 
own business. No criticism, no urge to go out and 
make progress can be afforded because these might disturb the delicate balance of the peace. 43 
With the onset of "the Troubles", however, both the 
Unionist· and Nationalist parties began to fragment. 44 
Divisions within each camp caused new political parties to 
be developed. The Ulster Unionist Party was originally 
divided internally by the pressures exerted by NICRA and the 
question of conciliation with Catholics. When Stormont fell, 
the party could not withstand dissension wrought by the 
perceived interference of Britain in Ulster's internal 
affairs by the very fact of Direct Rule, and also by British 
insistence that Protestants share power with Catholics in any 
. future government. 45 Three new parties emerged in the 1972-
73 period. 
The Official Unionist Party (OUP) is the heir of the 
Ulster Unionist Party. The group exists to advocate one 
thing: maintaining the union with Britain. The Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) , . founded by Ian Paisley who leads the 
Free Presbyterian Church, insists that the union not only be 
\ 
maintained but that a return to a Stormont-type devolved 
parliament should occur. In effect, the\DUP stands for the 
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political independence of Ulster Presbyterians,· which. 
according to Stewart "was always more significant than either 
their nationalism or their unionism, and this is still true 
today. 1146 More than the OUP, the DUP takes ''populist" 
positions on important issues such as employment and housing. 
The Vanguard Unionist Party (VUP) is an evolutionary party 
in that it is the first to be willing to accept an 
independent Ulster as "the most realistic means of 
maintaining the Province's British heritage. 1147 
Additionally, members of the VUP maintain open contacts with 
members of the Ulster Defense Association, a paramilitary 
organization. 
While all republicans are nationalists, the politics 
vary. The Nationalist Party, paralleling the Official 
Unionist Party, exists for one purpose: a thirty-two county 
°' Ireland. Sinn Fein, a republican party and the political 
front for the IRA, had historically advocated Irish unity, 
and if necessary, the use of force to achieve that unity. 
When the IRA split into two groups in December 1969, Sinn 
Fein split into two parties. The political mouthpiece for 
the PIRA became Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), while the other 
is Official Sinn Fein (OSF) who acts on behalf of the 
Official IRA. 48 
The political objective of PSF, which would follow ~he 
I 
withdrawal of British troops after a victorious IRA campaign, 
}, 
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are to unite the four provinces (Ulster, Connacht, Leinster, 
. . .• 
and Munster) under a socialist federation. The Ulster 
'provincial parliament would have a Scots-Irish (Protestant) 
'"" majority. Political power would be delegated from a national 
capital to regional and district councils. PSF would 
nationalize key industries, and withdraw Ireland from the 
European Economic Community. 49 
, 
The OSF in league with the Official IRA, adopts a 
'\ ·.:..F-, 
Marxist approach in that they seek to .raise the consciousness 
of the working class as a viable political block who must 
. 
unite and lead a communist r~v6lution. This revolution would 
ideally occur simultaneously in the North and South effecting 
not only the departure of the British from Northern· Ireland, 
but an abolishment of the Dublin government as well. OSF 
would, of course, be in the vanguard of thfs revolution - the 
founders of a new unified Marxist state. 50 
As PSF and OSF were having their philosophical 
differences, the nationalists began to al'so splinter. In 
1970, sev~pal politicians of the Nationalist Party, who had 
been civil rights activists, broke with the prevailing 
orthodoxy (of not working wit1:lin · the existing political 
.... «1,-•-· .... . 
institutions) and founded the Social _Democratic and Labour 
Party (SDLP). Like NICRA, their goal was to work within 
political institutions for social reform, while also 
maintaining a long term goal for Irish unity, provided that 
'\ 
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such unity was achieved peacefully, 51 The SDLP replaced the 
Nationalist Party as "the political representatives of the 
• 
Catholic Community. 1152 The change reflected "the belief that 
greater material benefits could be obtained by con$tructive 
participation in the institutions of the state" as opposed 
to the ''traditional anti-partitionist principles'' 
characteristic of the Nationalist Party. 53 
• Religion 
The role that religion plays in the division betwe~rt the 
two ethnic groups is linked not so much to the effect it has 
on existing policies in Ulster, but rather to the fear that 
Protestants have concerning its effects in a united Ireland. 
In the Republic, the Irish constitution once recognized the 
special position of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
nation. 54 Although the constitution was amended so that the 
provision on the church's status was changed, catholic 
doctrine and the pronouncements of Church leaders influence 
political decisions on such issues as birth control, 
abortion, marriage and divorce. While. the impact of the 
Church on the Irish population has lessened in the wake of 
the Second Vatican Council, ,.compared to other European 
countries Irish Catholic fervor is still strong. Protestants, 
therefore, have a real fear that any compromise leading to 
... 
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a united Ireland would place.them in a Catholic influenced 
state whose policies would be antithetical to their way of 
life. 
This is not to minimize the effects that religion does 
have as a "reassuring anchor", to borrow Enloe's phrase, for 
the people of Northern Ireland. At the same time, on the 
Protestant side their religious beliefs are not monolithic. 
Heskin notes there are fifty-five fiercely independent 
denominations, forty-two of which have less than a thousand 
members. 55 Nevertheless, what unites these Protestants is a 
genuine fear of the Roman Catholic Church. 
Fear of the Church lies in three areas: (1) its strength 
as a large international organization; (2) the ability of its 
priests to impose its views on its members; and (3) its 
appearance as a fortress-like institution with separate 
schools, convents/ and monasteries, led by the Vatican. 56 
This fear colors the view that Protestants have of Catholics 
as a people that simply cannot be trusted. 
Because of the cultural division that exists between the 
' 
ethnic groups, an abiding importance of kinship fosters an 
atmosphere which inhibits either group's • engaging • in a 
dialogue with the other. Analysis of Ulster prejudice by. 
" -
Harris indicates that when people of both faiths gather, "the 
obvious aim was to prevent social relations being ruffled by 
disagreements over subjects on which it was accepted that 
cv 
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there could be no consensus·. 1157 Given that on almost any 
topic, '' it was immediately assumed that. there was Catholic' 
and Protestant viewpoints on these questions, •.. it is not 
surprising that it is only with members of the same side that 
individuals could relax enough to talk freely, to say what 
. they thought. 1158 
* * * * * * * * * * 
As described above, it ~appears that the divisions that 
separate the two groups, Protestants and Catholics, leave 
very little room for compromise. But things are not always 
so black and white. First, both ethnic groups have shared a 
history, although related to both Britain and the Republic, 
which is unique to the six counties. Second, when once both 
groups were unified in their political position, "the 
Troubles" have been the catalyst for their fragmentation. 
This has been a positive occurrence. The evolution of the 
principles for which the SDLP and the Vanguard Party stand 
could lend themselves toward a dialogue, no matter how 
tentative. 
An inescapable significant characteristic is that the 
Protestant/unionist position suffers from a real nationality 
prob(lem. Catholics in Northern Ireland readily admit to their 
being Irish. Ulster Protestants claim to be British. Northern 
Ireland is not, however, part of Britain. Great Britain is 
·the territorial unit~ of Scotland, Wale~, and England. The 
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very name of the realm, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, demonstrates the distinction of 
., 
Northern Ireland as different from Britain. Moreover, British 
people see Ulsterman, Protestant and Catholic, as non-British 
- or more precisely as Northern Irish. 59 Why, then, does the 
Protestant in Northern Ireland claim to be British? Finnegan 
provides an answer: 
The Ulster Protestant identifies with Britain in 
symbol and political loyalty because it is the 
alternative to the Irish Catholic identification . 
• • • The Ulster Protestant may not really have a 
nationality at all - i.e. an Ulster nationality -
but adopts the British nationality for essentially 
negative reasons, not to be part of the Irish-
Ireland. 60 
Secondly, the nationalist claim that Ireland, because 
of its physical situation as an island, and because the 
' 
majority of the island is Irish-Irish should be unified is 
not necessarily a valid argument. Such reasoning fails to 
recognize the artificial, • i.e. negotiated, borders which 
exist between many sovereign states throughout the world. 
Additionally, the argument does not consider the distinct 
historical development of Ulster which, as was noted, 
separated Ulster from the rest of Ireland. 
The effects of this separation ~s especially significant 
for the politics of the present when it is considered that 
for the past six decades,~since the end of the Irish civil 
war when pro-Treaty forces prevailed over those who had 
rejected partition, the Republic has enjoyed , relatively 
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stable parliamentary government. The border is not a 
·dominant political issue in the South. 61 In fact, evidence 
suggests that most of the Irish in the Republic fear a united 
Ireland since it would add to itself a population that has 
become radicalized by civil strife for the past twenty years. 
In a major statistical study, MacGreil found that 78% 
in a sample of 2,259 residents of Dublin advocated a thirty-
two county I·rish Republic, i.e. a unitary state as the 
solution to the Northern Iris·h problem. 62 Yet, probing deeper 
into the attitudinal surveys, 59% agreed with the statement 
''Catholics • in N.I. have more • in common with Northern 
Protestants than they have with Catholics in the Republic". 63 
Fifty-five percent agreed that "Northerners on all sides tend 
to be extreme and unreasonable" . 64 And, perhaps most 
significantly, only 55% disagreed with the statement 
"Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic are two separate 
nations. 1165 Ultimately, what the study concludes is that 
"(a) ttitudes towards the integration of :tiorthern Ireland 
internally and with the Republic of Ireland are quite 
dynamic 1166 which is to say that they are not al together 
certain. 
It is true that most Irish opinion polls demonstrate 
that majorities consistently advocate territorial unity 
between North and South, but these poll~ are highly suspect 
as~ to their true meaning. What is likely is that the opinions------~ 
I 
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in these polls on the particular question of Irish unity 
reflect more of a romantic fancy than a considered reflection 
on the political consequences of the answer. 
Irish politicians, too, have historically advocated a 
united Ireland because, like American politicians who 
advocate no increase in taxes, it is fashionable or, more 
politically • wise. importantly, this practice • lS But 
apparently waning since hardly any mention at all was made 
of Ulster in the recent Irish parliamentary election. 67 
It is contended, therefore, that Northern Ireland is 
truly distinct from both Great Britain and the Republic of 
Ireland by virtue of its unique historical and cultural 
from this discussion • 1S development. What the emerges 
realization that while (roughly) one-third, who are 
Catholics, have an affinity with their counter-parts in the 
CJ South, ·the two-third majority, who are Protestant, do not 
. 
'-.. 
have either an affinity with the South or a rightful claim 
to the British nationality. The differences are magnified 
further in light of British policies for Ireland under Direct 
Rule. And it is these policies which are the focus of the 
next chapter. 
\. 
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Chapter III. Britain and Direct Rule 
When Direct Rule~ began, over sixteen years ago, 
Northern Ireland ceased being an Irish, or at least an 
Ulster, problem and became a British problem. In 1969, as was 
6 
noted, London's intervention was required to quell riotous 
civil unrest. The failure of Stormont to deal effectively 
with terrorism and its unwillingness to relinquish the powers 
of law and security to Britain broke the camel's back and 
Westminster abolished the Northern Ireland government. Yet, 
what was assumed by Britain to be a temporary measure has 
-~ continued, and has_ not been successful in ending violence. 
What were Britain's efforts to return Ulster to ''normalcy" 
and why have they failed? This chapter investigates that 
question. 
The United Kingdom's policies in Ulster have a two-fold 
goal. First, on a political level a return to a· devolved 
parliament is desir~d. Second, on a security level terrorism 
is to be defeated. Often, it s6all be· shown, efforts have 
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largely and lately dealt more with the problem of terrorism 
than with a political s~ttlement which would allow for the 
end of Direct Rule. 
' 
Political Initiatives 
The Heath G0vernment was short-lived, and its regime 
. over Northern Ireland even shorter (lasting from March, 1972 
to December, 1973). 69 This period witnessed the sowing of the 
seeds of the political agenda for Ulster, which was, and 
continues to be,. the insistence that a future devolved Ulster 
parliament be based on a power-sharing agreement between the 
two communities. 
Two legislative Acts were adopted at Westminster. The 
first, the Northern Ireland Assembly Act 1973, provided for 
a provincial assembly elected by proportional representation. 
This would break with the usual British method of a "first 
past the post"/winner take all electoral process. This was 
followed by the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. This 
Act reaffirmed the Government's position that Northern 
Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and would remain so 
·<1..,. • 
unless a majority of people voted otherwise in an official 
border poll. Further a councilar Executive, appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, which had as its 
~ ' .. ,, . 
members politicians from the main parties was established. 
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The electidn for the new Assembly took place in June, 1973; 
and a.coalition of Unionists who were sympathetic to the idea 
of power sharing, SDLP members, and members of the Alliance 
Partyro was appointed to the Executive. 
The price that the SDLP exacted for its participation 
in the Assembly and Executive was for Britain to accept a so-
called "Irish dimension" in Northern Irish politics. This 
referred to the part that the Republic might play in aiding 
political stability in the province. The Northern Ireland 
Constitution Act 1973 provided that institutions should be 
established that would allow for consultation and cooperation 
; 
between the North and the Republic. 
A conference met in December, 1973, at Sunningdale to 
discuss ways to address the Irish dimension. The meeting 
included representatives of the British and Irish Governments 
and leaders of the Ulster political parties. What emerged 
from the conference was an agreement to set up a Council of 
Ireland with an executive council and an assembly that would 
be equally divided by elected members from the Dail 
(Ireland's parliament) and the Northern Ireland Assembly. The 
Irish Government recognized Northern Ireland as a part of the 
United Kingdom and agreed that no change in that status would 
occur without the consent of the majority of the province. 
With the sunningdale Agreement approved in the Assembly, the 
Executive took office on January 1, 1974 and Direct Rule had 
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• seemingly ended. • 
'The Sunningdale Agr~ement split the Unionists so that 
two groups .emerged. Those favoring the Council of Ireland 
were led by Brian Faulkner (i.e. Faulkner Unionists). Those 
opposed were led by William • Craig. Opponents saw the 
agreement as a step toward an end to the union and a united 
Ireland. The PIRA was also against the agreement because it 
feared the consequences of diminished -·influence over the 
Catholic population. 
Ultimately, events overtook the political process. The 
Ulster Unionist Council rejected the Sunningdale Agreement 
forcing Brian Faulkner to resign the leadership. Britain, 
saddled with a miner's· strike, underwent a change of 
Government as the Labour Party and Harold Wilson regained 
power. The unionist parties united forming a United Ulster 
) Unionist Coalition to fight· .the idea of a Council of Ireland 
as well as power sharing. This was followed by a crippling 
strike led by the Ulster Worker's Council which was enforced 
by loyalist paramilitary organizations. These events were the 
catalyst for the resignation of the Unionist members of the 
Northern Ireland executive which brought down the devolved 
government and caused the resumption of Direct Rule. 
The failure of the power-sharing executive prompted a 
new approach by the B.ritish government. Whereas the 
., 
initiative for the new Assembly had come largely from the 
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British Government and its bilateral negotiations with the 
political parties which led to a conference, the new regime ' 
' 
of Harold Wilson sought a constitutional convention, the 
members of which were limite.d to Ul 1ster politicians, which ( I 
would debate and recommend a new Ulster government. The 
advantage of this plan, it was thought, would be that any 
proposal from the convention would be an Ulster-initiated 
~ one, rather than one imposed by London. 
The Convention met on May a, 1975. As.a result of the 
election that preceded it, the Convention was dominated by 
the United Ulster Unionist Council parties (it won 47 of the 
78 seats). The SDLP attained only 17 seats, with the 
remaining going to fringe parties. 71 The result was 
inconclusive. Although the Convention issued a report, it 
contained only UUUC proposals and thus the Secretary of State 
for No,hern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, believed it did not 
command sufficiently wide acceptance through the Ulster , 
community. 72 The Convention ended in stalemate and w~-S, 
abolished by the Government on March 5, 1976. 
From 1976 until the Conservative victory in 1979, there 
were no new political initiatives from the Labour Party -
.. 
this despite a change in party leadership as James Callaghan 
replaced Wilson as prime minister. 
\ 
. 
While the Conservative Party recently celebrated its 
tenth year in power, the administrations of Margaret Thatcher • 
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have not concentrated on political initiatives in Northern 
Ireland. In fact, after the initial failure .of her first 
.. 
secretary of state, l, Humphrey Atkins, to achieve results ,, 
through exploratory talks with · 1eaders of the Ulster parties, 
the idea of a political initiative in Ulster was abandoned. 
•' ' ) 
The Problem of Terrorism 
Upon the abolishment of Stormont, the Scots-Irish 
I 
majority in Ulster were furious and were led to a kind of 
"" solidarity with Protestant extremism. In an effort to prevent 
civil war from breaking out (sectarian violence was at its 
height), the Official IRA declared a cease-fire. PIRA soon 
followed, but only after Secretary of State William Whitelaw 
agreed to enter into secret talks with PIRA on Ulster 
affairs.~ These talks provided de facto recognition of the 
IRA as a political entity with which the JJ.,.K. was obliged to 
bargain. 74 
Internment was a contentious issue among the Catholic 
• 
brunt of its effects . The minority who had born the 
Government established a commission chaired by Lord Diplock 
(hence its name) the mandhte of which was 
to consiqer 'what arrangements for the administra-
tion of justice in Northern Ireland could be made 
in order to deal more effectively with terrorist 
organizations by bringing to book, otherwise than 
by internment ... individuals involved in terrorist 
activities ... ; and to make recommendations•. 75 
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The Diplock • • • Comm1ss1on found that "intimidation by 
terrorist organisations of those persons who could be able 
. 
to give evidence for the prosecution if they dared" was the 
"main obstacle to dealing effectively with a terrorist crime" 
in the courts. 76 Until this fear of intimidation was 
alleviated through governmental measures, "the use by the 
Executive of some extra-judicial process for the detention 
of terrorists cannot be dispensed with. 1177 While not 
• justifying internment per se, the commission did see its 
utility. Nevertheless, it held that "however effective 
[internment] may be in fact, [it] can never appear to be as 
complete as the safeguards which are provided by a public 
I 
trial in a court of law. 1178 ) 
I 
The commission recommended, as a means of alleviating 
<.." 
the problem of witness intimidation, the trials of terrorists 
be presided over by one judge with no jury. Bail could only 
be granted by a High Court judge and "only if stringent 
requirements are met. "79 
One of the criticisms of the Diplock Report is that it 
''was produced for the authorities responsible for law and 
order and not for the people of Northern Ireland as a 
whole. 1180 · The focus of the report I was myopic. Hillyard 
argues: 
The underlying problem of the political struggle 
•.. was .•. ignored and the sole focus was upon the 
, maintenance of public order. In this context, civil 
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rights in general and the rights of suspects in 
particular appear as exceptional, anachronistic 
and even subversive. 81 
The Diplock~eport was significant in the development 
of British anti-terrorist policies because much of its 
recommendations 
legislation. 
were incorporated into subsequent 
The ,Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1913 
established, among other things: non-jury trials for 
"scheduled", i.e. terrorist, offences ; 82 strict regulations 
,. 
for the issuance of bail to those charged with a terrorist 
offence; 83 and, the continued provisions· for search and 
arrest without warrant of anyone suspected of being a 
terrorist. 84 Furthermore, the Act established punishments to 
persons, not only for being members of proscribed 
organizations,~but also to any;11on-member who "dresses or 
behaves in such a way as to arouse reasonable apprehension 
.;II 
that he is a member .of a proscribed organization. 1186 · Among 
I 
the proscribed organizations were two major nationalist 
groups, the IRA and Sinn Fein, and two unionist groups, the 
Ulster Volunteer Force and the Red Hand Commandos. 87 The Act 
also proscribed the Ulster Freedom Fighters, but this is a 
fictitious cover name for the UDA. 88 The UDA itself was not 
proscribed. 
The provision for search without warrant had a very 
large impact on the citizens of Northern Ireland. For 
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example, the number of houses searched.by security forces 
climbed from 17,262 in 1971 to 75,000 in 1973, "one-fifth of 
"' 
' all houses in Northern Ireland"! 89 
The following year, the British Parliament applied some 
J, 
of the measures enacted in the Northern Ireland Act to Great 
Britain through the Prevention of ' Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1974. The Act empowered the Home Secretary 
to proscribe an organization "that appears to him to be 
concerned with terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom ana 
connected with North Irish affairs. . . . "; 90 and to make it 
illegal for one to belong to such an organization. 91 
Likewise, it made illegal the public display of support for 
a proscribed organization. 92 The Home Secretary is also given 
powers to bar entry to, or to evict from, Great Britain those 
persons he believes "[are] concerned in the commission, 
preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism. 1193 Section 
-7 and its appended schedule allow for arrest, search, and 
seizure without warrant. Curiously, however, unlike the 
previous Act, it lists only one proscribed organization - the 
IRA. 
. Controversy surrounded the power of the Home Secretary 
. /' '--- / ·., 
,, '_,,. ..... ./ '-...,,._ -, 
to bar entry to, or to evict from, Great Britain suspected 
terrorists. Through regulations which set out the specifics ft 
of this power,. the police may detain and hold for questioning 
those who are considered sou~ces, of information on terrorist 
...... 
1,1,.._,, 
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activities at any port of entry. 94 Moxon-Browne reports on a 
repult of these regulations. 
From 1974 to June 1979, 4146 persons were· thus detained for questioning .... Under 'exclusion 
orders', in the same period, 140 people were 
removed from Britain to Northern Ireland, and 29 to the Republic. About 90 per cent of the people detained at ports have no charges brought against them. 95 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act was criticized by 
British civil liberties groups. One such group said the Act 
"'nullifies the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus by making 
it lawful for the police to arrest on extremely wide 
grounds;' and [because of] claims that fingerprint records 
and photos of all those questioned are kept in police 
files. "96 
Certainly both laws are uncharacteristic of a liberal-
democratic state, and Britain's political institutions have 
had to suffer, in this respect, an apparent lack of 
legitimacy in the eyes 9f Ulster citizens. Finn, citing a 
1985 survey by a "non-aligned" newspaper, the Belfast 
( 
Telegraph, found that "57 percent of Catholics believe that 
'in the main the legal system in Northern ·rreland dispenses 
justice' unfairly or very unfairly. Only 9 percent of the 
Protestants agreed. 97 Because of the widespread Catholic 
dissatisfa9.tion with Northern Irish justice, the Diplock 
Courts are another contributing factor to ''Catholic 
alienation from· the state. 1198 
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In addition to legislative tactics, the U.K. Government 
used another controversial method to, in this case, placate 
terrorists. In 1972, one of th~ concessions that the IRA, and 
others, gained as a result of their dialogue with Whitelaw 
(see above) was the granting of Special category status to 
·prisoners.In granting such status, the 
British government agreed to five demands: ·1) IRA 
prisoners would have the right to wear their own 
clothes; 2) they would not be required to do 'penal 
labor'; 3) they would have the right to associate 
freely with the·ir colleagues within their own 
prison area; 4) they would receive certain 
educational facilities; and 5) prisoners who had 
lost remission of sentence because of their 
protesting behavior in prison would have it fully 
restored. In return, the IRA agreed to stop its 
campaign of violence. 99 
The impetus for the Government's dectsion is explained by 
Holland: "In 1972 the Provisional IRA were at the peak of 
their strength; their hunger-striking members [in prison] 
were near death when the [G]overnment conceded, afraid that 
the security forces would be unable to contain the violence 
expected if [the IRA prisoners] died. 11100 
In achieving Special Category Status, the IRA and other 
terrorists (for the s_tatus was given to both Catholic and 
Protestant terrorists) achieved a great symbolic victory. The 
.British "had acknowledged, in effect, that the IRA prisonets 
were not ordinary crimin~ls· but po).itical prisoners. " 101 This 
1 • 
gave the terrorists legitimacy because a recognition 6f the~ 
IL 
IRA prisoners as political rather than criminal~ prisoners was 
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"tantamount to admitting that there is a justifiable cause 
,. ' 
for struggle, for violence. " 102 ~ 
Despite the use of internment, the establishment of the 
Diplock Courts, and the distinction of Special Category 
status as methods to thwart terrorism, terrorist violence 
cont'inued to take its toll. "By the spring of 1974 the total 
[dead]. • . reached and passed the thousand mark." Wounded 
"numbered 14,000, and property damage and losses exceeded 
$200 million. 11103 In the autumn of ~974, 20,000 British troops 
were stationed in Ulster. 104 
However, the British Army did have some success in 
rooting out IRA members and interning them. In 1972, for 
example, the army claimed that it had reduced the number of 
active IRA terrorists from one thousand to three or four 
hundred. 105 Later, British intelligence achieved significant 
-
penetration of the IRA such that, in mid-1974., a master plan 
for \the take-over of Belfast was captured. 106 In an effort to 
reestablish discipline among its ranks, the IRA killed ~ 
informers of whom they were certain, and shot suspected 
informers in the knees. 107 
While the eff arts of the a-rmy to root out the IRA were 
successful, the success was not absolute. The sensational 
bombing of the two pubs in the'English city of Birmingham by 
the IRA in November, 1974, demonstrated that Northern Iris·h 
.. 
terrorism was "exportable" to Great Britain. The nineteenth r, 
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deaths that resulted caused a British outcry for the new 
Government of Harold Wilson to do something. This resulted 
in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 (see above). The 
purpose of the Act was to establish an anti-terrorist law for 
Britain. 
The Labour Government offered a new strategy in dealing 
with Ulster terrorism. Its "central aim was to deny totally 
the political dimensions of the conflict and to reconstitute 
the problem in terms of law and order. 11108 It therefore 
initiated three related policies: (1) the restoration of full 
law and order responsibilities to the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary; (2) the end of internment in February 1975 and 
the use of the Diplock courts as the sole method of dealing 
with suspected terrorists; and (3) the end of Special 
Category status on March 1, 1976. 109 The first was known as 
Ulsterization, the second and third were known as 
"criminalisation". 
According to Kenny, however,. the consequences of 
criminalisation "increased rather than diminished Catholic 
alienation. 11110 Due to strict controls placed on government 
interrogation methods, there became "an increased reliance 
on the evidence of accomplices (of political violence], now 
that direct confessions ·were harder to come ~y. 11111 The use of 
these. informers, called "supergrasses", caused consternation 
among both catholics and Protestants because many were "being 
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convicted and imprisoned as terrorists on the uncorroborated 
evidence· of in.formers. 11112 
The end of Special Category status caused 
t 
further 
confrontation as IRA • prisoners refused to • wear prison 
clothes. The jailers responded by "removing the mattresses 
.and beds from the cell as well as any reading material. • 
• until 8: 3 o p. m. when mattresses were returned. " 113 As the 
standoff continued, "prisoners [were] locked in their cells 
twenty-four hours q day naked except for a blanket wrapped 
around them. 11114 Conditions in the prisons were deplorable. 
Nationalist terrorist organizations responded by 
murd~ring twenty • prison wardens. By 1980, street 
demonstrations had become commonplace, and statements from 
diverse sources including members of both the American 
Congress and the British Parliament were made soliciting 
Government concessionl · for the prisoners. 115 
Then came the hunger strike centered on prisoners in the 
Maze. In solidarity with the strikers, Ulster nationalists 
elected one of the prisoners, Bobby Sands, to Parliament in 
a bye-election. Riots, brought on by public outrage that the 
Thatcher Government would not grant concessions, caused 50 
deaths in 1981 .. Howev.er, the European Commission on Human 
J 
Rights, a prior critic of the British government, f9und "that 
the sufferings 
inflicted. 11116 
' 
' 
of the protesting 
45 
(· 
,, 
• prisoners were self-
i) 
j 
n 
• 
f ·-·· 
.;. . ,-.. \ ... : 
.. 
I 
, While the Government won the battle of the hunger 
strikes at the Maze (Sands died in 1981 along with several 
of his compatriots), the cost to the government not only in 
terms of money but also in stability was considerable.· 
Hillyard reported: 
In the north there were 1,205 demonstrations 
requiring two and a half million hours of police duty. The total cost of policing these parades and the ensuing order was over 12 million pounds. During the period a hundred thousand rounds of 
rubber bullets were fired, sixteen thousand in one 
month alone. The hunger strikes and the 
authorities' response did more to unite Catholic 
opinion than any other single event since internment in 1971 or Bloody, Sunday 1972. 117 
Ulsterisation, for its part, placed the British Army in 
a precarious situation. Maxon-Browne explains: 
From the army's point of view, the present policy is far from satisfactory as evidenced by the fact that the [IRA] is alive and well. First, ... [under the rules of engagement, a soldier] must wait for the terrorist to take the initiative [before he can 
open fire]. Second, the fact that the army is used 
as a police force in areas where the RUC is 
regarded· as unacceptable, suggests that the 
soldiers ought, in some cases, to have police powers .... Finally,· and most crucially, despite public statements to the contrary, the army feels it cannot succeed in the task it has been 
assigned. 118 
Nevertheless, the army continues today in Ulster as the most 
visible symbol of ,Direct Rule .. 
The current Govfrnment of Prime Minister Margaret 
;• t 
·, t L., 
Thatcher has accomplished three anti~terrorist measure~: the 
refusal to concede on the issue of Special Category status 
t. 
(which has already been discussed above), the Hillsborough 
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Agreement in 1985, and the recent moves to further curb 
' individual freedoms in the name of combat\ng terrorism in 
1988. 
The Hillsborough Agreement is a landmark docum~nt in the 
history not only of anti-terrorist policies in Ulster, but 
of Anglo-Irish relations as well. For the first time, it 
formally gave the Republic of Ireland a consultative role to 
play in the affairs of Ulster during Direct Rule. Since the 
collapse of the S~nningdale Agreement, low-level contacts 
between the Republic and the U.K. were maintained. 119 These 
talks emphasized Britain's desire for closer policing of the 
border by the forces of the Republic to prevent the Irish 
side of the border from becoming a refuge for terrorists. The 
Irish government, for its part, sought to project an 
appearance of continuing a process toward Irish unity. 
The Republic was in no way soft on terrorism. Many, if 
not all, of its own anti-terrorist measures have been adopted 
by the .British government, especially under Thatcher. These 
methods include the use of a Special Criminal Court 
(established in 1972 under the Republic's Offenses against 
the State Act 1939)· which sits with no jury. An amendment to 
this Act "placed the onus on the individual to repudiate any 
published allegation that he was a member of the IRA [long 
p;oscribed in the Repu-blic) -~ A further amen~ment to the 
~ct in 1976 prohibited spokesmen for proscribed organizations 
\. .. 
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"to appear on radio or television, or be quoted in the 
press." 121 
Thus, both countries realized that perhaps progress 
could be made against terrorism in Ulster if the two entered 
into a close arrangement with the understanding that Britain 
and Ireland were "recognising the major interest of both 
their countries and, above all, of the people of ~orthern 
Ireland in diminishing the divisions there and achieving 
lasting peace and stability;" 122 and were "reaffirming their 
-total rejection of any attempt to promote political 
objectives by violence. 11123 
The agreement established an Intergovernmental 
Conference·which would be the principal vehicle for Anglo-
Irish consultation on matters of Northern Irish politics, 
security, and the administration of justice as well as cross-
border cooperation. 124 Provision was also made to allow for 
the d·irect input of the views of the Irish Government 
concerning "bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland. 11125 Consideration would be given to "mixed 
courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain 
[presumably terrorist] offences·. " 126 Furthermore, both 
Governments committed themselves to enhanced security 
cooperation (threat assessments, exchanges of information, 
technical c<;>9peration,) . 127 Finally, the agreement referred to 
the,) possibility of a future majority in Ulster givi.ng formal 
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• "consent to the establishment of a united Ireland. 11128 
The reaction to the Hillsborough Agreement in Uister was 
varied. Cox documented that " ( 1) ess than one-third" of 
Catholics ''believed it enhanced the prospect of a united 
Ireland. 11129 Protestants learned of the agreement with ''a 
profound psychological shock, not only because it was 
negotiated 'over their heads, but because it gave Dublin a 
role in Northern Ireland for the first time ever." 130 Indeed, 
London had not consulted with Unionist politicians in the 
period leading to the accord, while Dublin officials were in 
close coordination with leaders of the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party. 131 
Terrorists, predictably, rejected the accord. Sinn Fein 
indicated that IRA activities would continue, while the UDA 
made death threats against members of the Intergovernmental 
Conference. 132 A new wave of violence followed. Twenty-three· 
security officers were killed in 1985-86 by the IRA. From 
November 1985 to February 1986 more than one hundred 
policemen ·were injured in battles with unionists. 133 Moreover, 
a new loyalist terrorist group, the Ulster Resistance, was 
created to fight against the notion that Britain would 
abandon Ulster to a united Ireland, a goal recognized by the 
Hillsborough Accord. It was this group which ~as recently 
unsuccessful in exchanging a British-made ·antiaircraft 
missile with South- Africa for weapons and ammunition. 134 
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Two new policies were announced in October, 19 8 8 • First, 
' 
a ban on the broadcast via radio or television of interviews 
~ 
,with either members or supporters of terrorist organizations 
. . in Northern Ireland was enacted. Second, by an · Order in 
Council the judiciary in Northern-Ireland were to be advised 
that a suspect's silence in criminal trials for terrorist 
offences may be interpreted to be an admission of guilt if 
there is evid~nce that points to such guilt. 
These policy initiatives were a direct reaction to a 
dramatic terrorist event - th~ August 2 O, 1988 bombing by the 
IRA of a bus carrying forty British soldiers (eight of whom 
were killed) • in . ' . The Ulster town of Omagh. 135 The U.K. 
Government justified the policies for several reasons. In the 
case of the broadcast ban it was argued by Douglas Hurd, the 
Home. Secretary, that "Terrorists. • .draw support and 
sustenance from having access to radio and television, and 
from.addressing their views. • .directly to the population 
at large. • • • " 136 Further, the secretary noted that this 
policy had long existed in the Republic of Ireland. 137 The 
rationale for the curbs on the right to silence was that 
security officials "knew 90 percent of the front line IRA 
terrorists but did not have the ability to convict them in 
• 
court" based c;,n existing rules of evidence. 138 
... 
Despite protests from many sectors of the British 
public, including politicians and journalists, against these 
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two policies, they continue in effect. Even the Irish 
Government was farced to acquiesce. 139 
'An Assessment 
Having described the political initiatives and the anti-
J;c 
terrorist policies of the British Government, the question 
of their effectiveness must be addressed. It would be 
simplistic to measure the value of British policies by 
stating the obvious: a return to devolution and the ending 
of terrorist violence has not occurred. Thus, an acceptable 
fl 
criteria must view the tangible realities that have occurred 
in Northern Ireland as a result of, or despite, British 
policies. 
Britain entered Northern Ireland because of violence. 
!~deed, ·it has been said that violence is "the single most 
consistent factor in Northern Ireland political life since 
1969. 11140 Statistics would unquestionably support such a view. 
From 1971 until 1984, terrorism was responsible for 2,372 
deaths, 24,981 injuries, 29,242 shooting incidents, and 7,831 
explosions. 141 The level of violence in Ulster requires the 
presence of 12,000 British soldiers, 7,000 policemen, 4,500 
police reservists, and 8,000 members of the Ulster Defence 
Regiment (the Ulster "national guard") . 142 I I ./, To maintain these 
personnel, the British Treasury spends approximately 500 
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million pounds (about $775 million) each-year. 143 In the 1987-
88 fiscal year, the cost of the British army's presence alone 
was expected to be 168 million pounds ($260 million), which 
is an increase from 144 million pounds ($223 million) 
1986-87. 144 
• in 
Yet for ·a11· this . ' capital expenditure, paramilitary 
organizations are very much alive and well. This has occurred 
for several reasons, one of which is a remarkable evolution 
of the terrorist organizations themselves. This evolution has 
appeared to have caught the authorities off-guard. 
First, the paramilitary organizations have become 
sophisticated in acquiring technologically advanced weaponry. 
At the start of "the Troubles," terrorists relied upon 
"straight-forward blast and incendiary bombs made f.rom farm 
,-
fertilizer and gelignite boosters. 11145 Today, the PIRA, for 
example, utilizes powerful explosive devices made of Semtex 
which are detonated by radio control.-Such devices have an 
explosive velocity of 8,400 meters a second. 146 ·Police 
. 
attempts to prematurely detonate these radio-controlled bombs · 
through the use of high-powered radio wave sweeps have been 
largely ineffectual because the explosives are built to be 
activated by coded signals. 147 
Additionally, Northern Ireland has witnessed the 
development of a remarkable underground economy developed by 
'-
terrorist organizations on both sides to financially support 
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their influence in certain • regions, particularly in the 
divided city of Belfast. 
While deaths from terrorist incidents, per year, have 
for the most part declined since 1976, 148 comparison of ·armed 
robberies and monies stolen in the years 1971 and 1983 are 
telling. In the former year there were 437 armed robberies 
and thefts of 273,300 pounds ($410,000). In 1983, by 
contrast, there were 622 armed robberies and 830,258 pounds 
($1.2 million) was stolen. 149 
Ulster Is terrorist groups have become racketeers in 
organized crime operations which add a new dimension to the 
terrorism problem· that security officials face. Terrorist 
I 
organizations are engaged in lucrative construction frauds 
which generate annual profits of 10 million pounds ($15 
million) for the various Protestant and Catholic groups (or 
a combined business of 40 million pounds ($60 million). 150 
The Ulster Defense Association established seeming legitimate 
security companies which extort customers for protection. Two 
of these companies have annual incomes of 200,000 pounds 
($300,000). 151 Both activities, the construction fraud 
(dominated by the Catholic groups) and the security racket 
(ddminated by the Protestants) are well coordinated between 
the two sides as are armed robberies·which involve 50,000 
pounds ( $75,000) · or more. 152 These huge sums are then 
laundered, in the case of the PIRA through its taxi cab 
, 
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business of which it holds a virtual transportation monopoly 
in the Catholic ghettos. 153 
Of particular effect on the Catholic.population was the 
PIRA scheme that established a finance agency which channeled 
.#. funds into the purchase of legitimate shops and stores (a 
. 
butcher shop, a pub, a supermarket, an inn), the profits of 
which were funneled back to the PIRA. With these monies the 
group started a construction firm and built more shops and 
a playground. Catholic people began to view the IRA as a big 
help I in I I improving their neighborhoods and living 
conditions. 154 
Although in 1984 "the British government (estimated] 
that the total strength of the IRA comprises no 
more than around 300 men and women, ... this small 
number are [sic] backed up by several thousand 
sympathizers. Between them they cost the Bristish 
government 4 million pounds ($6 million) a day in 
their, attempt to control terrorism. 155 
The result of all this, and the impact of British anti-
terrorist policies is, as Adams states: 
While the counter-terrorist forces of the RUC and 
the British-government have been concentrating on 
killing and capturing IRA leaders, the IRA have 
quietly and most effectively built a revolutionary 
infrastructure based on economic subversion. In 
the process the division between terrorism and pure 
crime has become blurred, and some terrorism is 
t 11 . l . . 1 t . . t d . 156 ac ua y simp e cr1m1na ac 1 vi y an vice-versa. 
An additional problem of British anti-terrorist policy 
is that it is not universally applied. The government, as 
well as the media, makes a distinction between Protestant and 
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Catholic terrorism, with the former being viewed as somewhat 
legitimate. Tom King, the former secretary of state for 
Northern Ireland, 157 was quoted as saying 
The Protestants are in the main a much more 
reactive force.... The security forces have had 
greater success against them in any case .... To be 
honest, they don't have the evil sort of 
dedication, skills, and cunning of the I.R.A. The 
reality is that they haven't. presented a threat, 
al though they are capable of some very nasty crimes 
and there are some very evil men amongst them. 158 
There is much contradiction in such a statement. If the 
Protestants haven't presented a threat, how is it there was 
. " 
absolutely no consultation with unionist officials in the 
time just prior to the Hillsborough Accord? What group was 
it that called the general strike in 1974 that brought the 
power-sharing executive to ruin? Whose group was negotiating 
with South Africa concerning the exchange of British 
antiaircraft missiles for ammunition and weapons? King's 
statement,· certainly not g~arded and yet typical, 
demonstrates frustration and weakness vis-a-vis the IRA, and 
serves to be inflammatory. It demonstrates a British bias in 
favor of loyalist terrorists which can only· be self-
defeating. After all, how can-any anti-terrorist policy be 
effect __ ive when the application of the policy is either half-
hearted or contr.adictory? Either terrorism ia a totally 
'" 
unacceptable method of behavior, or it isn't. 159 
The British ambivalence manifests its uncertainty over 
what direction Ulster policies should take. For the Prime 
,, 
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Minister to simply state continually: 
We must carry on with our present pledge to the 
people of Northern Ireland, which is that there 
will be no change in their stat4s, except at their 
wish and through their express consent and the 
express consent of the House [ of Commons] 160 
' demonstrates a clear lack of leadership on an issue that the 
record indicates has cost the United Kingdom much in lives 
and resources. More than this, it is a recipe for stalemate 
since·such a statement theoretically absolves the British 
government of responsibility for Ulster and places it 
squarely on the shoulders of Ulster politicians. Yet, 
Catholic and Protestant _intransigence is being underwritten 
~· 
by Direct Rule and the subvention that continually flows from 
the British treasury. No matter how much it would like to 
escape responsibility, the British Government must, if it has 
any hope of a future $.ettlement, see reality as it is and 
begin to think in terms of solving the political problem in 
Ulster, of which terrorism is but a symptom. If London is 
. 
_, 
really serious about defeating the IRA, it will devote its 
energies to finding a real solution to the status of Ulster 
in the United Kingdom. 
In conclusion, the history of British policies during 
the troubles have proven to be fragmentary and essentially 
reactive. A lack of an understanding of the nature of 
terrorists themselves as they have evolved from political 
gunmen to part-terrorists, part-racketeers is evident. Since 
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the direction that past political efforts and anti-terrorist 
measures have failed, it is reasonable to state that the 
status quo is unacceptable. New alternatives must- be 
explored, and these will be the focus of the next chapter . 
, .. .,.,. 
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Chapter IV: Looking at Alternatives 
If the past policies have not worked, and clearly they 
have not, what are some potential solutions to the problems 
of Ulster? There are several options. First, however, it 
should be obvious that a return to devolution as ·existed 
prior to Direct Rule is out of the question. It was the 
Stormont institutions which caused the present "Troubles" 
inasmuch as they were unable to satisfy the legitimate 
demands of the minority. 
Secondly, the Protestant majority has made it quite 
cle.ar that a power-sharing arrangeme;Jt would be unacceptable 
in the context of an all Ireland framework as was proposed 
• 
in the early seventies. 
There remain the following alternatives to consider: (1) 
a devolved government and legislature that includes a power-
sharing executive and a proportionately elected legislature 
within the United Kingdom; (2) the integration of Nor.thern 
. Ireland as a province of the United Kingdom without a 
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devolved government; (3) a declaration by the U.K. Government 
that Ulster is part of Ireland and that the United Kingdom 
shall bear no responsibility for, nor exercise sovereignty 
over, Northern Ireland and that such power and responsibility 
shall ·be assumed by the Republic of Ireland and its 
government in Dublin; or (4) an Ulster independent of both 
Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. These will now be 
considered in turn. 
Devolution 
• 
A return to a devolved administration and parliament in 
Northern Ireland has been a g9al of British policy ever since 
. 
Direct Rule began. This alternative, in order to be credible, 
would include the arrangements that came out of the 
Sunningdale Conference except for those involving the 
Republic of Ireland. A unicameral legislature elected by 
proportional representation would grant to the Catholic 
minority roughly one-third of seats in any assembly, and the 
executive's membership would be divided equally between 
Catholics and Protestants. The link with Britain would be , 
maintained. 
An advantage of this option would be the .resumption of 
Ulstermen taking charge of their political and governmental 
affairs. Self-government should, of course, be a hallmark of 
59.t 
.•. ~ 
.. 
\ 
.1 
any settlement. Additionally, power-sharing in the exe9utive 
would help insure against government policies that might 
discriminate , against the minority, thus provi~ing some 
benefits to Catholics. Alternatively, Unionists generally 
would be especially pleased that governmental powers had 
returned to Ulster with the British union intact. They, 
therefore, would have a stake in insuring the success of the 
government because were devolution to fail, the alternatives 
may not be as sanguine. 
The present climate might favor devolution if, as 
expected, most people in Northern Ireland have become weary 
of the violence. An Ulster government that has the support 
of tpe SDLP would encourage a united front against terrorist 
groups of both faiths. With terrorists isolated, their 
legitimacy would be undermined so that a return to a level 
of stability as existed from 1956 to 1967 would recur. If 
most Ulst~rmen thought this to be likely, they just might 
welcome devolution. 
Another advantage of devolved government concerns its 
impact on Northern Ireland's economy. Twenty years of violent 
upheaval have made Northern Ireland an unattractive location 
~ for investment; foreign investment virtually collapsed in the 
i/1' 1970s. 161 The United Kingdom, unfamiliq.r with Ulster matters 
from the beginning of "the Troubles, " took a piece-meal . 
' approach to-the needs of Northern Ireland's economy. In her r 
,., 
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overview of the • economic constraints in Ulster affairs, 
Leslie McClements concluded: 
[In the early seventies] expensive infrastructure 
projects were adopted because they were expensive 
and could absorb funds quickly .... Economic 
appraisals of these ... public expenditure projects 
were not undertaken, and more effective uses of 
the same funds were not considered. When the public 
expenditure came under pressure in the late 1970s, 
the momentum of earlier years was difficult to 
halt. Again the basic facts and analyses were not 
available to allow the effective reallocation of 
financial resources. This resulted in dislocation 
and a period of painful readjustment which the more 
effective use of funds in earlier years would have 
largely avoided. 162 
Ulster has the highest percentage of long-term unemployment 
in the United Kingdom, 163 with most of the burden falling on 
Catholic males at a rate of two and one-half times that of 
' 
Protestants. 164 
Any settlement that lends itself to public order would 
be welcome. However, devolution would also theoretically 
allow for Ulstermen to tak~ charge of their own economy. 
Surely some financial aid from London would have to be 
maintained despite the end of Direct Rule. The point is, 
however, that London's vision of Ulster's economic woes have 
been lacking, an·other defect in the status quo. Devolution 
offers hope for a better direction in the future. 
Even acknowledging the economic and security benefits 
,that might accrue to Ulster if enough support of moderate 
\ 
Protestant and Catholics were obtained, the problem with 
devolution is that th·e plan may be seen as a step backward 
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in Northern rr·eland' s development. Catholic protests and 
paramilitary activity had won the end of the Stormont regime. 
As events unfolded, the British government acknowledged that 
the issue of minority rights was important. London then 
recognized the need for a power-sharing government if 
devolution were to be realized. Within the last decade, 
Britain has recognized its "special relationship'' with the 
Republic regarding affairs between both countries, 
particularly Northern Irish affairs. The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement expresses the desire for a change in Ulster's 
status in the United Kingdom as long as such change is 
j 
brought about peacefully. Therefore, the road to Irish unity 
seems to have been painstakingly laid out since 1972. Seen 
in this perspective, Ulster's Catholics may maintain their 
demand that any plan for devolution require a role for the 
Republic. Of course, this is something that loyalists have 
steadfastly refused to concede. 
Protestants, desp.rte the obvious need for some 
consensus, may also reject power-sharing devolution. After 
the short-lived power-sharing government had fallen in 1974, 
·., 
the Unionist-dominated constitutional convention of 1975 had 
the opportunity to propose a new government for Ulster. Well 
aware that. any proposal would require the inclusion of a 
power-sharing arrangement so as to be acceptable to London, 
the· Unionists made it quite clear that they would rather 
''i~. 
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suffer Direct Rule than agree to power-sharing with 
Catholics. 
Integration 
The possibility of the political integration of Northern 
Ireland into mainstream United Kingdom politics has become 
a recent topic of debate both in Britain and in Ulster 
brought on by a growing number of Ulstermen desiring an 
affiliation with the main British parliamentary parties -
something l_ong denied to Northern Ireland. In the past, 
British political parties had done their best to keep 
Northern Irish affairs out of Parliament, especially when 
devolution was in existence. Today, despite Direct Rule, the 
British parties have not been anxious to inject themselves 
into Ulster electoral politics. Those favoring integration 
hope to gain entry into British political life. 
Direct Rule disenfranchises the people of Northern 
Ireland in two ways. First, the secretary of state, by virtue.-
of his office, is viewed-~s, in O'Malley's words, 
a dictator, ruling his fiefdom from his castle at 
Stormont .•.. (M)ost executive functions of the old 
regime, including responsibility for economic and 
security matters, passed into the Secretary of 
States handsfi. He can propose and dispose almost at 
will. But as a ruler he does not have to answer at 
the ballot box to his constituents, who come.from 
the shires of the mainland, not the counties of 
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Northern Ireland. 165 
f 
Secondly, when Direct Rule was instituted, the people 
. 
of Northern Ireland were not effectively provided a means of 
participating in British politics even though Britain was 
directly involved in the governance of the province. This is 
true because the political system of the United Kingdom is 
dominated by two political parties: the Conservative Party 
and the Labour Party. At the present time, only one of these 
parties will form a Government. Herein lies the issue of 
integration, for presently both parliamentary parties have 
refused an affiliation of Ulster groups seeking to join their 
organizations. 166 
The political isolation of Ulster from maipstream 
politics is further understood when the provisions of the .. 
Government of Ireland Act 1949 are examined. This Act, 
Roberts notes, 
allows for Southern Irish nationals resident in Great Britain to enjoy all the rights of British 
citizenship: nationals of the Republic resident in England, Scotland and Wales may [for example] vote for the British Labour Party, join it, work for it, take part in formulating its policies (including its policy on Northern Ireland) and 
stand for election to Parliament or local government councils as official Labour 
candidates. . . . [Conversely, ] British citizens 
resident in Northern Ireland are not permitted to do any of these things. 167 
While u1s·ter does elect representatives to Westminster, 
they are forced to choose among parties which reflect the . ,. 
. 
I sectarian divide. The Ulster Unionist Party and Democratic 
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Unionist Party are Protestant, the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party, Sinn Fein, and Official Sinn Fein are Catholic. 
Yet, Members of Parliament from these Irish parties will 
never sit on either the Government's or Opposition's front 
benches, nor, obviously, serve in the Cabinet. Therefore, an 
Irish MP has a minimal or non-existent impact on government. 
Bernadette Devlin was not exaggerating when she wrote, "· . 
• [A] Member of Parliament representing an English 
constituency can. • .use the system to the benefit of his 
constituents; but the Northern Ireland MP is hardly more than 
a public relations officer .. 11 168 • • 
Those who advocate integration, such as Ivor Stanbrook 
who is a Tory MP, say this option "would allow for the 
elimination of sectarian differences" and "could bring peace, 
.. 
stability and reconciliation". 169 They have attempted to hold 
the Prime Minister to her rhetoric that "The Conservative 
Party is not a Scottish party nor an English party nor a 
Welsh party nor an Irish party. We are a party of the whole 
United Kingdom. " 170 
.. 
Thus it would be expected that with integration 
"(i)ndividual Unionists and Nationalists e (would) come 
together in normal political parties to -cooperate on the 
basis of shared • views on social, • economic and other 
i~sues. 11171 An intended consequence of integration would be 
a diminishment in the legitimacy of separatist terrorist 
,. 
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groups, principally the IRA, because "the IRA can. hardly hav~ 
a result more favourable to their purposes than the Tory 
. 
I 
\ 
Party's exclusion of Ulster from its organisation and 
membership. 11172 
Northern Ireland, in an integrated Parliament, would 
perhaps gain as many as three more seats in Parliament (from 
17 to 20), and the Cabinet member for Northern Ireland would 
likely be an Ulsterman since the off ices for Wales and 
Scotland are headed by a native of those regions. 1~ 
· While all this is probably true, the greatest advantage 
to integration would be the determination once and for· all, 
or at least for a lengthy period of time, the status of 
' 
Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. As Rose put it, 
~~•''' ,,.' ~ ' I 
Ulster "could no more fall under government from Dublin than 
might Birmingham, Manchester, or Leeds. 11174 With this 
decision, Great Britain would declare its commitment to see 
Ulste~'s problems as its own, and dedicate itself to doing 
its utmost at every level to solve many of them - not just 
the problem of terrorism. 
Political realities, however, make the possibility of 
Britain deciding on integration. highly unlikely. First, for 
Britain to adopt integration would 'be contrary to the 
understandings reached in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 
particularly that Britain's efforts would be directed toward 
devolution. 175 Moreover, the Agreement specifically mak~s 
• 
.• 
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provision for the possibility of a united Ireland, along with 
a pledge from the British Government that it would introduce 
legislation to . that effect. 176 The Irish governihent surely 
would react negatively to a policy of integration such that 
the close cooperation between the two governments on border 
security (for anti-terrorist purposes), the very cause of 
bringing the accord into existence, may be impaired. 1n 
A second, and perhaps more significant problem is the 
nationality gap, already referred to in chapter two, which 
exists between the British and the Northern Irish. This is 
a very powerful barrier to integration, and it should be 
given careful recognition. After broaching the topic of 
integration to Merlyn Rees, the former Labour Home Secretary 
and an Ulster Secretary of State replied: "Neither the Labour 
Party nor the Conservative Party will venture into Northern 
Ireland. Northern Ireland is different and all we aim for 
must be to let Ulster develop from both sides. The English 
are outsiders. " 178 
Rees' position is very typical of British opinion toward 
Ulster. Despite Unionist declarations that they themselves 
are British, the media and the civil service continually 
refer to the people of Ulster as Irishmen. 1~ The deg~ee of 
. 
bloodshed since 1969, an almost daily occurrence, emphasizes 
the distinction so that, in Rose's words, "Increased 
Westminster respons-ibilities in Ulster are formally opposed 
;. 
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on the grounds that the problems are atypical and unsuitable 
for Westminster's governance. 18° For a British Government to 
succeed on achieving int~gration in the face of these 
problems would require vigorous leadership on the Irish 
question which, of course, has been severely lacking . 
Therefore, integration is not a viable alternative for 
the Irish question. 
United Ireland 
If the scenario of a united Ireland were to occur today, 
it would have to come about without the sanction of a 
plebesci te on the border - the long-sanctioned method of 
achieving Irish unity. 181 With Protestants holding an 
approximate two to one majority of the Ulster population, the 
question of a 32 county Ireland in such a poll would surely 
fail. More probably, a British military withdrawal concurrent 
with a new Anglo-Irish treaty which would cede Northern 
Ireland to the Republic would be, required. Catholic 
nationalists and the Republic would achieve their so-called 
destiny of territorial unity, and the British would be rid 
of a territory that has been a constant thorn. Three parties 
would be satisfied; one would not. 
There would be tremendous difficulties • • 1n 
Ireland. The most substantial obstacle • 1S 
"· 
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intransigence. The evidence is quite clear that above all 
things"· .. the most psychologically deep-seated reason why 
Protestants in Northern Ireland are resistant to a united 
Ireland is that they fear the Catholic Church. 11182 
Protestants fear the influential position of the catholic 
Church in Irish state affairs. Protestant paramilitary 
organizations, particularly the UDA have made it clear that 
they would rather have independence than a united Ireland. 
A change would take place, such that whereas today the IRA 
gains the focus of attention, tomorrow the UDA would be 
preeminent as the greater threat to the state 
Ireland. 
• in a new 
Yet, leaving aside Protestant objections, the simple 
fact is that the Republic also has its concerns about the 
costs involved. Rose observed: 
... (W)hen Irishmen who live in the Republic read about bombings and murders in the North, they become aware of the disadvantages of making the whole Ireland one. To them it seems that violence might be the price of unity. 183 
The experience of Merlyn Rees while secretary of state for 
Northern Ireland supports Rose. 
,/1..r, 
No Southern government in my period of office had ~ put its mind to what it would do if the North ever fell ·into its lap .... Deep-down, ... the Southern politicians understood the reality: the loyalists would fight incorporation with ·the South and without their cooperation, Dublin could not govern the North. All Irish governments have recognised, 
. . t . t . th . 184 and con 1nue o recognise, 1s ..•. 
Irish antipathy toward a united Ireland is rooted in its 
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not-so-distant history. The Irish national experience has its 
origins in a civil war over the terms of the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty in·the early 1920s. Today's two main parties, Fianna 
Fail and Fine Gael, are the legacies of the two sides in that 
war. Thus, they 
I 
I 
\ 
want no repeat performance of recent painful 
history. They were, and are, firmly opposed to 
paramilitary organisations of whatever kind and 
-they continue to see the North as the tip of an 
iceberq which could wreck their own ship of 
state. ras 
Aside from the security and political implications, 
there is an economic consideration as well. While the economy 
of the North has borne the effects of the decline of 
industry, complicated by the climate of violence, the South 
has transformed its own economy from a dominantly rural 
society to a relatively stable urban one. 186 It was due to 
conditions of peace, among other reasons, that allowed the 
economy of the Republic to grow. The Irish certainly would 
be apprehensive of any measure that could h~ve a deleterious 
effect on its economy, particularly the fear of societal 
disruption that could attend unification. 
For these reasons, unification is not acceptable ·as a 
viable solution to a political settlement in Ulster. As 
' I Bowyer Bell summarizes: 
The prospect of a united Ireland with one million 
angry ·and violent Protestants and half that number 
of violent and radicalised Catholics holds little 
charm for the comfortable in Dublin. 187 
·• 
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Independent Ulster 
The preceding discussion of various alternatives to the 
problem of government in Northern Ireland shed light on the 
fact that while the British view the Northern Irish as too 
different from themselves to allow integration, the Irish in 
' 
the Republic consider Ulstermen too radical to be assimilated 
into a united Ireland. This observation makes the idea of an 
independent Ulster a challenging option worth scrutiny. 
An independent Ulster would 
\ initially 
• require: the 
withdrawal of British troops, the end of British sovereignty 
over Ulster, a renunciation of the goal of a united Ireland 
• 
on the part of the Republic of Ireland, and the disarming of 
both the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Defence 
Regiment pending the outcome of the formation of a 
government. 
With no military forces to speak ·of, a new Ulster's 
physical integrity could be guaranteed by both Britain and 
Ireland with the understanding that their armies would be 
'1 • __ -··;~ 
used solely forcfefense from an outside· force. This provision 
is actually superfluous since the greatest danger to the new 
state would be from within and no.t from without. , ·1 
) ,. 
This plan has a great deal of promise for several 
reasons. 
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Both Britain and the Republic of Ireland want peace in 
Ulster. The Anglo-Irish Agreement states as much. 1~ It is 
presumed that in the interest of peace, the former would 
agree to give up its sovereignty should the latter renounce 
its historic territorial ambitions. The political 
dispositions of the two countries toward the issues of 
integration and an all Ireland settlement would suggest that 
the alternative of an independent state would be more 
~ . 
acceptable to both countries. 
Indeed, the arguments against an independent state 
concern not so much the dispositions of either Britain or 
Ireland toward such a proposal, important though they are, 
but rather of Ulstermen themselves. 
The first of these is that if British troops were 
., 
withdrawn, civil war in the • province, initiated by 
Protestants because of their "siege mentali~y~' would surely,; 
follow. Foot calls this, ."a strong argument, which is often 
' 
won because it is not answered. " 189 
An independent Ulste,would eliminate the incentive and 
the rationale for a civil war. Protestants, as Finnegan has 
shown190 , call themselves British as a label that 
distinguishes them most of all as un-Irish. ~hey fear,the 
changes in their lifestyle under a government wh-ich 
• 1S 
heavily influenced by the Catholic Church. This is a very 
real issu~ for Protestants and ·the idea of an independent 
'-· 72 
" 
f< 
.,. 
~~ • . -· •. ..,.> 
~ 
' ' 
" . 
' . . . 
' 
Ulster accommodates that fear, especially when it includes 
a renunciation by the Republic of any territorial ambition. 
If it fell solely to the Protestant terrorists alone to 
fight a war, it must be remembered that they are a minority 
of the Protestant population. Moreover one of these, the 
Ulster Defense Association, has already declared its 
acceptance of the idea of independence. 191 The UDA is the 
largest Protestant paramilitary group, estimated at 50,000 
members, whose loyalty is to Northern Ireland more so than 
Protestantism. 192 With UDA acceptance, that would leave only 
the Ulster Volunteer Force as a potential dissenters' group, 
and their purpose is to agitate for the link with Britain, 
a purpose that would be non-existent under the proposal. With 
Protestants faced with a fait accompli, loyalist 
paramilitaries would ce~se to have a mission for political 
violence, and, should they persist in violent political 
behavior, they would be revealed as simply a criminal element 
that could accrue no legitimacy to themselves. 
It may also be assumed that Protestants and Catholics 
simply cannot live together, or that the fear of Catholics 
I 
would remain since demographically Catholics are expected to 
one day become a majority in Ulster, and with that the 
political situation would be drastically altered. 
As to Catholics and Protestants coexisting peacefully, 
'\" o' Brien makes a . salient point that in the Republic of 
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Ireland, "Protestants - 5 percent of the population - enjoy 
the same political rights as everyone else and flourish 
economically, and their leaders have repeatedly. . . testified 
to the fair and generous treatment they have received from 
the State. 11193 
I .,/, 
(/ 
Demographics became an important factor in Ulster 
politics because of British policies which consistently 
stated that there would be no change in the status of 
Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom without the 
consent of the majority of the province. 194 Yet Walsh's 
analysis indicates that \_ ~teven on the assumptions most 
favourable to the growth of the [Roman Catholic] population, 
it would be well into the next century before the province 
would have [a Roman Catholic] majority. 11195 If Walsh's 
I 
conclusions are correct, Protestants would hav~ until, say, 
the year 2050, to help fashion a democratic government which 
would encourage Catholic loyalty to the st~te, and provide 
guarantees to the minority - a status that Protestants will 
one day share. Demographics becomes an incentive for both 
groups to reach a modus vivendi with each other. 1% 
Of special importance to the proposal is that the 
withdrawal of Britain from Northern Ireland deprives the 
.. 
national separatist terrorist groups (the Official IRA, the 
' Provisional IRA, .and the Irish Republican Army) of their 
stated purpose: to drive away the British Army.·· 
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This consequence of the plan would be a delicate matter 
for the British government because it might appear, at first 
glance, as caving in to terrorism. Objectively, there is much 
truth to this. The separatist gunmen want Britain out; 
withdrawal for Britain would admit its defeat. Yet the PIRA 
would achieve only a partial victory because there • 1S 
virtua·lly no chance of Provisional Sinn Fein achieving a 
socialist state, nor of Official Sinn Fein achieving a 
communist state, within the framework of a united Ireland. 197 
In fact, there is every hope that with new institutions of 
state coming into existence in Ulster the terrorists would 
····· · be viewed, both by the authorities and the populace, as the 
criminals that Adams has shown they have become, 198 rather 
than the single-minded guerillas they once were. 
But on what basis can it be expected that "new 
institutions" might actually thrive in a new-found Ulster? 
The answer may concern "nation-building", i.e. the theories 
that describe the processes by which nation-states evolve. 
In an article by 
. 
Walker Connor 199 an important 
distinction is made between state and nation. A state is "a 
legal concept describing a social group that occupies a 
defined territory and is organized under common political 
~ 
ins ti tut ions and an effective government. " A nation is 11 · a 
,J t ( 
social group which shares a common ideology, common 
institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity. 11200 In 
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the process of nation-building what f is sought ' is an 
assimilation of two or more nations (in states that are non-
homogeneous) so that institutions can develop that will 
accommodate the various ethnic identities. 201 
In Northern Ireland, therefore, there are two 
unassimilated, or perhaps partially-assimilated, nations, 
Protestant and Catholic. Nationalism in Ulster is to the 
nation (either to the native Irish, or to the Scots-Irish). 
If the plan of an independent Ulster is to be successful, an 
evolution from a nationalism that is ethnocentered to one 
that ' 1S territorially-centered #is required. 202 An 
understanding of the present pattern of loyalties in Ulster 
suggests that this evolution would be long in duration. A 
movement away from the extremes in Ulster society certainly 
is a painstaking affair. Yet, moderates do exist in Ulster. 
The SDLP and the Alliance Party are examples of those who do 
not live by, nor advocate, violence. 
While it is impossible to predict with certainty the 
actions of Protestants and Catholics in an independent 
Ulster, group identity with Ulster has been noted by various 
observers. Rees, for example, attributes Ulster's "fifty. 
years of de facto independence" as causing ''Ulster 
nationalism" which "is not something that can be ignored. 11203 
He cites the literary and musical culture in Northern Ireland 
that manifests the development of both communities, and is 
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expressive of a ''common Ulster outlook''. 204 
o 'Malley, on the other hand, disagrees that such an 
identity for Ulster exists. "· .. (T)he forging of a common 
identity [is not] a simple matter as it has been made out to 
be," he states. Of the distinctiveness of the two sides, 
O'Malley·goes on to say: 
Both communities may feel abandoned by their 
putative reference groups, the Republic and Great 
Britain, but a common sense of apartness does not 
provide the impetus for developing a common sense 
of purpose, especially when both communities have 
an unequal sense of who they are in the first 
place. The Protestants ... may be in search of an 
identity, but Catholics are not .... 205 
Perhaps O'Malley is correct, and Rees merely expresses 
wishful thinking brought on by years of frustration and 
fatigue in having dealt with Ulster politics and violence. 
Nevertheless, O'Malley concedes that: 
Northern Ireland's instability comes in part from 
the fact that she is perceived as being 
impermanent. Ending the uncertainty· that 
impermanence gives rise to is an argument for 
independence. But for independence to work it would 
have to be seen as a final solution, not an interim 
one. The future would have to look out for 
itself. 206 
This is precisely the assumption that underpins thi~ thesis . 
• 
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CONCLUSION 
No solution to the Ulster problem is without difficulty. 
This paper proposes a radical alternative as the best means 
of securing peace. It envisions a giant departure from the 
politics of today by advocating neither a continued union 
nor, the obvious alternative, an end to the border. Criticism 
should, therefore, be expected - particularly from many who 
may simply refuse to see Northern Ireland as anything but 
"Irish", or from others who tremble with thoughts of civil 
war at the severance of the union. 
Another point of concern is the reception of the plan 
among the British population. It is unquestionable that were 
Ulster to be independent, the status of the British Isles as 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
would be fundamentally altered. Nevertheless, it can be 
confidently assumed from the evidence in this paper that the 
', 
response of the British people would be one of relief rather 
.. . . .,.., 
than misgi~ing at having the costly Ulster problem removed 
L 
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from their responsibility. 
It may be asked why a redrawing of the border was not 
analyzed in chapter four as a possible alternative? The 
answer is that, on its face the idea would simply recreate 
the status quo in miniature. The fact is that the Catholic 
and Protestant populations are so mixed in Ulster that there 
is no easy way of redrawing the border to create a greater 
Protestant majority than al~eady exists. 207 
Another possibility which is often mentioned includes 
forced resettlements, or paid resettlements, of either ethnic 
group to its patron country. Such an idea is even more 
radical politically than the concept of an independent state. 
The Republic certainly would object to an enticement by 
Britain of paying Ulster's 500,000 Catholics to resettle in 
the . Republic, as would the Catholics themselves. 
Alternatively, Britain would not look favorably upon the 
prospect of having to assimilate almost one million 
Protestants. 208 
.. 
Additionally, Northern Irish Catholics, as we have seen, 
view the Scots-Irish as invaders. Thus the concept of ,the 
invaders farcing a resettlement of Cathol-ics from what the 
Catholics consider their land would·~e quite objectionable. 
No matter what alternative is adopted as a plan of 
action, one thing is absolutely certain. The status . quo 
cannot continue. The tragedies bbrn by Northern Ireland as 
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well as Great Britain demand a concerted plan to solve the 
political stalemate. 
One of the signal failures is the refusal by the three 
Thatcher Governments to adopt a policy on Northern Ireland 
when it maintains a large majority in the House of Commons. 
During the twenty years of the troubles, only the 
Conservative Party under Thatcher has had the numbers 
(majorities of one hundred pr more) in Parliament with which 
to easily pass legislation to effect its agenda. Sadly, no 
use of them has been made to effectively rule Ulster. 
Instead, British policies for the province have come only 
after dramatic terrorist events, leaving all the initiative 
to terrorists while Northern Ireland's politicians remain 
deadlocked in intransigence, all comfor,tably underwritten by 
the British exchequer. 209 
In the absence of governmental initiative, the people 
in Ulster have little choice but to accept the activities of 
the paramilitaries as a legitimate means of filling in the 
void that exists there. While the void continues, the 
paramilitaries are ascendant and thus can intimidate anyone 
who , may have . second thoughts about the UDA' s or PIRA' s 
criminal transgressions. 
Furthermore, no matter how the British government tries 
• to insulate Great Britain from the affects of "the Troubles, " 
Northern Ireland's twenty years of violence has had a 
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deleterious effect on the mainland. Aside from the fatal 
bombings, such as in Birmingham in 1974, there is a more 
fundamental, and perhaps subtle, consequence. The Government 
has justified, and continues to justify, non-democratic 
domestic rules in Northern Ireland as necessary for the 
security of the state. Measures such as the recent ban on 
radio and television interviews with terrorists ·or supporters 
of terrorists, and the revision to the right to silence 
doctrine (which is soon to be applied to England and Wales) 
have important consequences for civil liberties. 
Since Britain does not have a written constitution and 
relies on the respect that Parliament gives to tradition and 
precedent, the survival of the broadcasting ban after 
judicial review210 , as well as other aspects of Direct Rule, 
have caused a debate as to whether Parliament should adopt 
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland and even Great 
Britain. 211 Regardless of whether one believes that a Bill of 
Rights in Britain is necessary to safeguard civil liberties, 
the central point is that British policies in Ulster are 
being viewed by some as undemocratic. These efforts are a 
dangerous precedent that could lead to further restriction 
on the traditional rights oi Englishmen. Thus_ the continued 
lack of a poiitical initiative in Ulster, and the single-
minded concern with the problem of terrorism, threatens the 
mainland in ways that are just as significant as the deeds 
81 
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wrought by the gunman . 
It continues to be evident that it is in Britain's 
interest to devote more attention to the Ulster problem. An 
independe~t Ulster would alleviate the trend toward anti-
.> 
democratic measures, would lessen the financial drain on the 
treasury, would enable greater flexibility in the use of 
military personnel abroad, and end twenty years of battling 
terrorism so close to home. 
The need for action was never more urgent. A change in 
the composition of the House of Commons such that the ruling 
party had only a slim majority with which to govern would 
perhaps enable Northern Ireland to become a political 
football. In such a situation, prospects for Ulster would be 
worse than they are now. It is today's opportunity that 
offers tomorrow its glimmer of hope. 
.\ . 
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